This paper focuses on the issue of determining to what extent a regulation that encourages and rewards companies to take measures to prevent corporate wrongdoing may be a better alternative to a pure command and control regulation. It also discusses whether a context-sensitive regulation is viable in legal systems in which a principle of obligatoriness is in force rather than a measure of discretion regarding punitive responses. The main ideas presented here are very similar to the concepts of responsive regulation and enforced self-regulation promoted by Ayres and Braithwaite; however, a comparative analysis of legal systems is carried out, highlighting current trends and their practical results.

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Author

Paulo De Sousa Mendes

Content type

Original Paper Published: 07 September 2022

Criminal Law Forum, Volume 33

Issue 3, September 2022